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The Problem of Religious Pluralism
Michael S. Jones, PhD
The “problem of religious pluralism” engages several distinct but interrelated issues. The
“problem” arises when one considers the variety of religious beliefs and practices in the
world and, taking into consideration both their similarities and differences, attempts to
formulate a coherent position on their origin, truthfulness, soteriological efficacy, and
value in general.
Of these questions, the one that has received the most treatment is the question of
the soteriological efficacy of the world’s religions. That all religions contain some truth is
not generally disputed: Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Islam have the truth of monotheism,
for example; some versions of Hinduism are also theistic in their final analysis of
ultimate reality (see, for example, the theologies of Sankara and Ramanuja) and have
well-developed theodicies, epistemologies, and absolutist ethical systems; the central role
of self-giving love in Mahayana Buddhism certainly has biblical parallels, and so on.
What Christians dispute is the eternal destiny of the adherents of these religions.
Scholars have staked out four main positions regarding this issue: strong
pluralism, moderate pluralism, inclusivism, and exclusivism. Most of these positions
have had supporters in the history of Christian thought, and most claim biblical support.
Determining which position is best involves understanding the positions and their
theological/philosophical implications and carrying out a thoughtful exegesis of the
relevant biblical passages.
Strong pluralism views all religions (or at least all major religions, possibly
excluding religions with significant practices that are morally repulsive, such as child
sacrifice or ritual prostitution) as effective in attaining their own ends. Proponents of
variations of this position include S. Mark Heim, Salvations: Truth and Difference in
Religion. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1995) and David Ray Griffin, Deep Religious
Pluralism. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005). According to this
view, all religions are more or less equally valid, and perhaps even equally true.
Christianity is true, and faithful Christians will go to heaven when they die; but
Buddhism is also true, and faithful Buddhists will achieve nirvana, just as Hindus will
attain moksa and Muslims will be rewarded in Paradise. This may seem like a clear
violation of the logical principle of non-contradiction, but proponents of strong pluralism
can argue that since each religion is true only for one group of people, the theory is not
asserting that all religions are true at the same time and in the same manner, and therefore
the view does not violate this principle.
The evidence in support of strong pluralism includes all the apologetical evidence
that can be marshaled in favor of each religion. David Hume famously argued that the
evidences for the truths of competing religious claims cancel each other out, and
therefore count as evidence against all religious claims. Strong pluralism provides a
different (and perhaps more consistently empirical) response to these evidences: they
count in favor of their respective religious claims, and therefore substantiate the claims of
their respective religions. It could be argued that all of the world’s major religions have a
strong empirical basis and therefore all should be viewed as empirically justified.
Additional advantages of this theory are that it is very egalitarian and that it should
encourage tolerance between the adherents of the world’s religions.

However, strong pluralism faces the dilemma that although it embraces the truth
of all religions, it is itself likely to be rejected by most of the practitioners of those
religions. It is a strange situation when a theory that maintains that all religions are true
must also maintain that all religions are mistaken regarding the truth of the theory itself.
Additionally, pluralism (both strong and moderate) seems to undermine the motivation
for evangelism and missionary outreach, a consequence that is unacceptable to
evangelical Christians (and to the adherents of other missionary religions as well).
Moderate pluralism views all (or most) religions as culturally mediated attempts
to grasp the same ultimate reality. It sees all religions as soteriologically efficacious in
attaining the same end. The paradigmatic example of moderate pluralism is John Hick’s
“pluralistic hypothesis” (see John Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths. London: Fount,
1977, and An Interpretation of Religion. London: Macmillan, 1988). Hick applies a neoKantian epistemology to religion: according to Hick, the world’s religions are human
attempts to grasp one ultimate and transcendent noumenal reality. This reality is known
by many names: God, Yahweh, Allah, Brahman, etc. The theologies constructed within
the different religions reflect the culture of each religion’s adherents as much or more
than they reflect the actual nature of the transcendent. Since all religions are worshiping
the same object, all produce the same soteriological result.
One significant advantage of this view is that it does not condemn anyone for not
believing in a God about whom s/he has not heard. By contrast, exclusivist views are
often construed as implying that God lacks mercy and compassion and as entailing
injustice on the part of God for making one’s eternal destiny dependent on circumstances
outside of one’s control. Moderate pluralism overcomes these problems, casting God as
completely merciful, compassionate, and just. Further strengths of this view are that it is
egalitarian and that it should encourage tolerance between the adherents of the world’s
religions.
Problems for moderate pluralism include the fact that it seems to do away with the
possibility of theological truth, turning all religious doctrines into culturally constructed
interpretations that never correspond to actual reality. In this respect Hick’s theory may
be inconsistent, since his position seems to rule out theological truth, but is itself both
theological and (presumably) true. Furthermore, although most Christians are probably
willing to admit that their conceptualizations of God cannot do justice to God’s true
magnificence, many might want to argue that some particular religious views have a
greater degree of correspondence to reality than do others, and that, therefore, some
religions are more correct than are others. Moreover, it has been persuasively argued that
moderate pluralisms like Hick’s are a form of inclusivism that proposes a new “metareligion” and subsumes all other religions under the umbrella of the quest for the
transcendent. In this way moderate pluralism actually privileges this new philosophical
meta-religion over all ordinary religions.
Inclusivism views only one religion as true, but views the other religions of the
world as soteriologically efficacious paths towards the God of the one true religion.
Examples of inclusivist thinkers include Karl Rahner, “Christianity and the NonChristian Religions,” in Theological Investigations, vol. 5 (London: Darton, Longman
and Todd, 1966), 115–34, and Sir Norman Anderson, The World’s Religions. (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans 1976). According to Christians who are inclusivists, Christianity is the
only religion that is true, but other religions reveal some truths that are used by God to

lead people to salvation. According to Rahner, the faithful practitioners of the world’s
great religions are “anonymous Christians” who are responding in faith to the work of the
Holy Spirit and would follow Christ if circumstances were such that they would have
revelation of the gospel and opportunity to respond to it.
A variety of considerations stand in support of inclusivism. Both versions of
pluralism mentioned previously are motivated at least in part by a worthy desire to
understand the world’s religions in a way that reflects God’s mercy, compassion, and
justice. Inclusivism shares this motivation, but responds in a way that is more clearly in
harmony with the principle of non-contradiction. Unlike the two versions of pluralism,
inclusivism does not undermine missions, the primary motive for which is proclamation
of God’s glory, though it does seem to take away some of the urgency of missions by
making salvation available even to those who have not heard the gospel. Unlike Hick’s
pluralism, inclusivism allows for the possibility of theological truth, although it seems to
entail that most religious traditions are in large part mistaken. Finally, inclusivism has
clear support in the history of Christian theology.
One problem for inclusivism is the very fact that it grants both theological truth
and the existence of a just and compassionate God. If God is just and compassionate, if
God is omnipotent, and if theological truth is possible, then it seems likely that God
would be able and inclined to arrange things so that most or all people are in a situation
amenable to having theological truth. However, it does not seem that God has done this
(except for the truths of general revelation), which is a situation that inclusivism needs to
explain. Additionally, it could be objected that if inclusivism were correct, then God
rewards incorrect religious belief by granting salvation to people who accept untruth.
Exclusivism views only one religion as soteriologically efficacious and the
adherents of all other religions as lost. Examples of exclusivist thinkers are James
Borland, “A Theologian Looks at the Gospel and World Religions,” Journal of the
Evangelical Theological Society 33, n. 1 (March 1990): 3-11, and Harold A. Netland,
Dissonant Voices: Religious Pluralism and the Question of Truth. Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 1991. According to Christians who are exclusivists, Christianity is the only
religion that is true, and although there may be some truths in other religions, these truths
are not adequate to bring about salvation.
One argument for exclusivism is that it is most transparently in harmony with the
principle of non-contradiction. As has already been seen, though, it may be possible to
reconcile pluralism and inclusivism with non-contradiction as well. Like inclusivism,
exclusivism allows for theological truth and has clear support in the history of Christian
theology. Exclusivism also provides the most motivation for missionary evangelism: if
the unreached will be eternally damned if Christians fail to bring the gospel to them, then
the urgency of the need to do so is clear.
One problem for exclusivism is that to many it seems unmerciful,
uncompassionate, and unjust of God to condemn millions to eternal punishment on the
basis of an ignorance that they have not chosen or on the basis of mere intellectual error.
Some question whether a loving God would design the world in such a way that people
must know about Christ in order to escape eternal damnation but have no ability to
acquire such knowledge. An additional problem with exclusivism is that it can and
sometimes has led to intolerance towards other religions.

It has been seen that there are arguments for and against each of the leading
interpretations of the situation of religious pluralism. It is not easy to determine which
view is correct based upon considerations of reason alone. Fortunately, Christians do
have another source of wisdom that they can turn to for answers to such perplexing
issues: divine revelation. There is biblical data that is relevant to the problem of religious
pluralism.
Strong pluralism seems to run afoul of the eschatological vision that runs
throughout the New Testament: a single future eternal state that awaits the “righteous,”
and another future eternal state that awaits all the “unrighteous.” If all people share in one
or the other of these two futures, then the strong pluralist vision of a distinct future for the
adherents of each religion is not possible. Heim suggests that the unique fulfillment of
each religion may be a penultimate eschatological state, which could be followed by a
final state that unites all religions in one. However, this strategy seems to reduce strong
pluralism to moderate pluralism. Strong pluralism also seems at odds with the numerous
biblical passages that condemn the neighboring religions of Israel and early Christianity
(cf. II Kings 17:15, 16, II Chron. 33:2, 3, Jer.10:1-16, Matt. 6:7, Acts 19:26, 27, Gal. 4:8)
and biblical assertions that there is only one true God, the God of the Bible (cf. Deut.
4:35, 39, II Chron. 20:6, Isaiah 45:5, 6, Mark 12:32-34, I Tim. 2:5, James 2:9).
Moderate pluralism fares better than strong pluralism vis-à-vis these biblical
considerations. While it makes a more positive appraisal of non-Judeo-Christian religions
than the passages cited above might seem to imply, it does not say that these religions are
true, and it does seem to imply that there is one single ultimate transcendent divinity,
which could correspond to the God of the Bible. Its relegation of Christianity to the status
of one interpretation among many viable interpretations of the transcendent will be of
concern to Christians, but since Christians accept that God’s magnificence surpasses
human comprehension, Christian hearts may resonate sympathetically with the
understanding of God that seems to lie at the core of this theory. The question that must
be addressed is the moderate pluralist view of the soteriological efficacy of non-Christian
religions. Do the practitioners of non-Christian religions attain salvation through these
religions and apart from Jesus Christ?
In John 14:6 Jesus is recorded saying “I am the way, and the truth, and the life: no
one comes to the Father, but through me.” The context of this passage indicates that Jesus
was discussing his own place in God’s plan of salvation. He seems to have viewed
himself not as one among many providers of salvation, but as the one necessary and
sufficient provider of salvation. This same soteriology is seen in I Tim. 2:5, where the
apostle Paul writes, “For there is one God, and one mediator also between God and men,
the man Christ Jesus.” If Jesus is necessary to salvation, then practitioners of religions
that are without Jesus do not attain salvation through these religions apart from Jesus.
Therefore moderate pluralism is not biblical.
The question that remains is whether there are true followers of God who do not
knowingly follow Christ. Are those people who respond with faith to the revelation of
God in nature and in the human heart (Psalm 19, John 1:9, Acts 14:16, 17, Romans 1:19,
20, Romans 2:12-29) “anonymous Christians,” as Rahner argued, or is salvation only for
those who specifically believe on the name of Christ?
There are a number of biblical considerations that seem to stand on the side of
inclusivism. These include the biblical depiction of the nature of God: one would expect

a God whose nature includes love (I John 4:8) and mercy (Luke 1:78, James 5:11) among
its central attributes to make a way of escape from damnation available to all people,
including those who have not received information about the Christ. Furthermore, the
Bible indicates that God desires the salvation of all people (II Peter 3:9); it can be
interpreted as saying that God has provided a soteriologically adequate revelation of
himself to all people (Romans 10:13-18, Titus 2:11); and it implies that God is drawing
all people to himself (John 12:32). All this is in keeping with an understanding of God as
an omnipotent creator. Surely such a being would create a world wherein his attributes of
love and mercy are effectively demonstrated.
In concord with these considerations, there seem to be true believers in both
testaments of the Bible who were neither Jews nor Christians (Job [Job 1:8],
Melchizedech [Genesis 14:18], Abimelech [Genesis 20:1ff.], the Queen of Sheba [I
Kings 10:9, Matthew 12:42], the centurion of Matthew 8:5-14, and Cornelius, who prior
to his conversion to Christianity was called “a devout man, and one who feared God with
all his household…and prayed to God continually” [Acts 10:2]). Peter’s experience with
Cornelius prompted him to say, “I most certainly understand now that God is not one to
show partiality, but in every nation the man who fears Him and does what is right, is
welcome to Him” (Acts 10:34-35). Such believers who are neither Jews nor Christians
are likely to have been adherents of other religious traditions, and are likely to have
obtained at least some of their beliefs about God through those traditions. Accurate
beliefs about God that exist in other traditions may be a result of God’s self-revelation
through nature and in the human heart, but the possibility remains that adherents of these
traditions gain at least some of the knowledge of God to which they are responding
through these very religions.
There are also a number of biblical considerations that seem to stand on the side
of exclusivism. Perhaps the most obvious of these is the negative view of other religions
in both testaments. Although the theology of the Bible sometimes reflects the influence of
the surrounding religions, the evaluation of these religions provided by the biblical
writers is almost exclusively negative (see Daniel I. Block, “Other Religions in Old
Testament Theology,” and Gregory K. Beale, “Other Religions in New Testament
Theology,” in David W. Baker, ed., Biblical Faith and Other Religions: An Evangelical
Assessment. Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2004).
More directly pertinent to soteriology are the many New Testament statements
that make belief in Christ a prerequisite to salvation. Some passages seem to require
belief in the specific name of Jesus. John 3:18 is illustrative of these, “He who believes in
Him is not judged; he who does not believe has been judged already, because he has not
believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God.” This, of course, requires more
detailed knowledge than is available through general revelation. Perhaps this is why Jesus
asserted that “repentance for forgiveness of sins should be proclaimed in his name to all
the nations, beginning from Jerusalem” (Luke 24:46-47). Perhaps he is affirming that
there is no salvation outside of knowledge of the specific details of the gospel.
Both inclusivism and exclusivism have been defended within the orthodox
Christian tradition, and both have defenders among contemporary evangelical scholars.
Both inclusivism and exclusivism preserve the finality of Christ. As has been seen, both
can claim biblical support. Since the Evangelical position on religious pluralism must be
based upon God’s revelation, this position must be developed through a thoughtful

exegesis that offers a reconciliation of the biblical considerations that are used to support
both of these views.
Recommended Readings from Evangelical Authors:
General:
Dennis L. Okholm and Timothy R. Phillips, eds., Four Views on Salvation in a
Pluralistic World. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996.
Richard J. Plantinga, ed., Christianity and Plurality: Classic and contemporary readings.
Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.
Inclusivism:
Gerald R. McDermott, God’s Rivals: Why has God allowed different religions? Insights
from the Bible and the early church. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2007.
Clark H. Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy: The finality of Jesus Christ in a world of
religions. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1992.
Exclusivism:
James Edwards, Is Jesus the Only Savior? Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005.
Harold A. Netland, Dissonant Voices: Religious pluralism and the question of truth.
Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991.

